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A TALK ON QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
OR
HOW ALICE OUTWITS EVE
VERSION 1.6
SAMUEL J. LOMONACO, JR.
Abstract. Alice and Bob wish to communicate without the archvil-
lainess Eve eavesdropping on their conversation. Alice, decides to take
two college courses, one in cryptography, the other in quantum mechan-
ics. During the courses, she discovers she can use what she has just
learned to devise a cryptographic communication system that automat-
ically detects whether or not Eve is up to her villainous eavesdropping.
Some of the topics discussed are Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, the
Vernam cipher, the BB84 and B92 cryptographic protocols. The talk
ends with a discussion of some of Eve’s possible eavesdropping strate-
gies, opaque eavesdropping, translucent eavesdropping, and translucent
eavesdropping with entanglement.
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1. Preface
1.1. The Unique Contribution of Quantum Cryptography. Before
beginning our story, I’d like to state precisely what is the unique contribution
of quantum cryptography.
Quantum cryptography provides a new mechanism enabling the parties
communicating with one another to:
Automatically Detect Eavesdropping
Consequently, it provides a means for determining when an encrypted
communication has been compromised.
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1.2. A Note to the Reader. This paper is based on an invited talk given
at the Conference on Coding theory, Cryptology, and Number Theory held
at the US Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland in October of 1998. It
was also given as an invited talk at the Quantum Computational Science
Workshop held in conjunction with the Frontiers in Computing Conference
in Annapolis, Maryland in February of 1999, at a Bell Labs Colloquium in
Murray Hill, New Jersey in April of 1999, at the Security and Technology
Division Colloquium of NIST in Gaithersburg, Maryland, and at the Quan-
tum Computation Seminar at the U.S. Naval Research Labs in Washington,
DC.
My objective in creating this paper was to write it exactly as I had given
the talk. But ... Shortly after starting this manuscript, I succumbed to the
temptation of greatly embellishing the story that had been woven into the
original talk. I leave it to the reader to decide whether or not this detracts
from or enhances the paper.
2. Introduction
We begin our crypto drama with the introduction of two of the main
characters, Alice ♥and♥ Bob, representing respectively the sender and
the receiver. As in every drama, there is a triangle. The triangle is com-
pleted with the introduction of the third main character, the archvillainess
Eve, representing the eavesdropper.
Our story begins with Alice and Bob attending two different universities
which are unfortunately separated by a great distance. Alice would like
to communicate with Bob without the ever vigilant Eve eavesdropping on
their conversation. In other words, how can Alice talk with Bob while at the
same time preventing the evil Eve from listening in on their conversation?
3. A Course on Classical Cryptography
3.1. Alice’s enthusiastic decision. Hoping to find some way out of her
dilemma, Alice elects to take a course on cryptography, Crypto 351 taught by
Professor Shannon with guest lecturers Diffie, Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman.
Alice thinks to herself, “Certainly this is a wise choice. It is a very applied
course, and surely relevant to the real world. Maybe I will learn enough to
outwit Eve?”
3.2. Plaintext, ciphertext, key, and ... Catch 22. Professor Shannon
begins the course with a description of classical cryptographic communi-
cation systems, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Alice, the sender, encrypts her
plaintext P into ciphertext C using a secret key K which she shares
only with Bob, and sends the ciphertext C over an insecure channel on
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which the evil Eve is ever vigilantly eavesdropping. Bob, the receiver, re-
ceives the ciphertext C, and uses the secret key K, shared by him and Alice
only, to decrypt the ciphertext C into plaintext P .
Figure 1. A classical cryptographic communication system.
What is usually not mentioned in the description of a classical crypto-
graphic communication system is that Alice and Bob must first communi-
cate over a secure channel to establish a secret key K shared only by Alice
and Bob before they can communicate in secret over the insecure channel.
Such a channel could consist, for example, of a trusted courier, wearing a
trench coat and dark sunglasses, transporting from Alice to Bob a locked
briefcase chained to his wrist. In other words, we have the famous Catch
22 of classical cryptography, namely:
Catch 22. There are perfectly good ways to communicate in secret,
provided we can communicate in secret ...
Professor Shannon then goes on to discuss the different types of classical
communication security.
3.3. Practical Secrecy. A cryptographic communication system is prac-
tically secure if the encryption scheme can be broken after X years, where
X is determined by one’s security needs and by existing technology. Prac-
tically secure cryptographic systems have existed since antiquity. One ex-
ample would be the Caesar cipher used by Julius Caesar during the during
the Gallic wars, a cipher that was difficult for his opponents to break at that
time, but easily breakable by today’s standards. A modern day example of
a practically secure classical cryptographic system is the digital encryption
standard (DES) which has just recently been broken1. For this and many
other reasons, DES is to be replaced by a more practically secure classi-
cal encryption system, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). In turn,
1Tim O’Reilly and the Electronic Frontier Foundation have constructed a computing
device for $250,000 which does an exhaustive key search on DES in 4.5 days[19]. See also
[2] and [14]. As far as I know, triple DES has not been broken.
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AES will be replaced by an even more secure cryptographic system should
the advances in technology ever challenge its security.
3.4. Perfect Secrecy. A cryptographic communication is said to be per-
fectly secure if the ciphertext C gives no information whatsoever about
the plaintext P , even when the design of the cryptographic system is known.
In mathematical terms, this can be stated succinctly with the equation:
PROB(P | C) = PROB(P ).
In other words, the probability of plaintext P given ciphertext C, written
PROB(P |C), is equal to the probability of the plaintext P .
An example of a perfectly secure classical cryptographic system is the
Vernam Cipher, better known as the One-Time-Pad. The plaintext P
is a binary sequence of zeroes and ones, i.e.,
P = P1, P2, P3, . . . Pn, . . .
The secret key K consists of a totally random binary sequence of the same
length, i.e.,
K = K1,K2,K3, . . . , Kn, . . .
The ciphertext C is the binary sequence
C = C1, C2, C3, . . . Cn, . . .
obtained by adding the sequences P and K bitwise modulo 2, i.e.,
Ci = Pi +Kimod2 for i = 1, 2, 3, . . .
For example,
P = 0110 0101 1101
K = 1010 1110 0100
C = P ⊕K = 1100 1011 1001
This cipher is perfectly secure if key K is totally random and shared only
by Alice and Bob. It is easy to encode with the key K. If, however,
one succumbs to the temptation of using the same key K to encode two
different plaintexts P (1) and P (2) into ciphertexts C(1) and C(2), then the
cipher system immediately changes from a perfectly secure cipher to one that
is easily broken by even the most amateur cryptanalyst. For, C(1)⊕C(2) =
P (1) ⊕ P (2) is easily breakable because of the redundancy that is usually
present in plaintext.
The only problem with the one-time-pad is that long bit sequences must
be sent over a secure channel before it can be used. This once again leads
us to the Catch 22 of classical cryptography, i.e.,
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Catch 22. There are perfectly good ways to communicate in secret,
provided we can communicate in secret ...
... and to the:
• Key Problem 1. Catch 22 : A secure means of communicating key
is needed.2
Finally, there are two other key problems in classical cryptography in need
of a solution, namely:
• Key Problem 2. Authentication: Alice needs to determine with
certainty that she is actually talking to Bob, and not to an impostor
such as Eve.
• Key Problem 3. Intrusion Detection: Alice needs a means of deter-
mining whether or not Eve is eavesdropping.
In summary, we have the following checklist for classical cryptographic
systems:
Check List for Classical Crypto Systems
 Catch 22 Solved? NO
 Authentication? NO
 Intrusion Detection? NO
3.5. Computational Security. Relatively recently in the history of cryp-
tography, Diffie and Hellman [7], [8] suggested a new type cryptographic
secrecy. A cipher is said to be computationally secure if the computa-
tional resources required to break it exceed anything possible now and into
the future. For example, a cipher would be computationally secure if the
number of bits of computer memory required to break it were greater than
the number of atoms in the universe, or if the computational time required
to break it exceeded the age of the universe. Cryptographic systems can
be created in such a way that it is computationally infeasible to find the
decryption key D even when the encryption key E is known. To create
such a cryptographic system, all one would need is a trap-door function f .
Definition 1. A function f is a trap-door function if
1) f is easy to compute, i.e., polynomial time computable, and
2Hired trench coats are exorbitantly expensive and time consuming.
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2) Given the function f , the inverse function f−1can not be computed
from f in polynomial time, i.e., such a computation is superpolynomial
time, intractable, or worse.
Figure 2. A public key cryptographic communication system
A trap-door function E can be used to create a public key crypto-
graphic system as illustrated in Fig.2. All parties who wish to commu-
nicate in secret should choose their own trap-door function E and place it
in a public directory, the “yellow pages,” for all the world to see. But
they should keep their decryption key D = E−1 secret. Since E is a trap-
door function, it is computationally infeasible for anyone to use the publicly
known E to find the decryption key D. So D is secure in spite of the fact
that its inverse E is publicly known.
If Alice wishes to send a secret communication to Bob, she first looks up
in the yellow pages Bob’s encryption key EB , encrypts her plaintext P with
Bob’s encryption key EB to produce ciphertext C = EB(P ), and then sends
the ciphertext C over a public channel. Bob receives the ciphertext C, and
decrypts it back into plaintext P = DB(C) using his secret decryption key
DB .
Alice can even do more than this. She can authenticate, i.e., sign
her encrypted communication to Bob so that Bob knows with certitude
that the message he received actually came from Alice and not from an
Eve masquerading as Alice. Alice can do this by encrypting her signa-
ture ALICE using her secret decryption key DA into DA(ALICE). She
then encrypts plaintext P plus her signature DA(ALICE) using Bob’s pub-
licly known encryption key EB to produce the signed ciphertext CS =
EB(P + DA(ALICE)), and then sends her signed ciphertext CS over the
public channel to Bob. Bob can then decrypt the message as he did before to
produce the signed plaintext P+DA(ALICE). Bob can verify Alice’s digital
signature DA(ALICE) by looking up Alice’s encryption key EA in the “yel-
low pages,” and using it to find her signature EA(DA(ALICE)) = ALICE.
In this way, he authenticates that Alice actually sent the message because
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only she knows her secret decryption key. Hence, only she could have signed
the plaintext.3
The RSA cryptographic system is believed to be one example of a public
key cryptographic system. There are many public software implementations
of RSA, e.g., PGS (Pretty Good Security).
Thus, besides solving the authentication problem for cryptography, public
key cryptographic systems appear also to solve the Catch 22 of cryptography.
However, frequently the encryption and decryption keys of a public key
cryptographic system are managed by a central key bank. In this case, the
Catch 22 problem is still there. For that reason, we have entered ‘MAYBE’
in the summary given below.
Check List for PKS
 Catch 22 Solved? MAYBE
 Authentication? YES
 Intrusion Detection? NO
4. A Course on Quantum Mechanics
4.1. Alice’s Reluctant Decision. In spite of Alice’s many intense efforts
to avoid taking a course in quantum mechanics, she was finally forced by
her university’s General Education Requirements (GERs) to register for the
course Quantum 317, taught by Professor Dirac with guest lecturers Feyn-
man, Bennett, and Brassard. She did so reluctantly. “After all,” she
thought, “Certainly this is an insane requirement. Quantum mechanics is
not applied. It’s too theoretical to be relevant to the real world. Ugh! But
I do want to graduate.”
4.2. The Classical World – Introducing the Shannon Bit. Professor
Dirac began the course with a brief introduction to the classical world of
information. In particular, Alice was introduced to the classical Shannon
Bit, and shown that he/she/it is a very decisive individual. The Shannon
Bit is either 0 or 1, but by no means both at the same time.
“Hmm ... ,” she thought, “I bet that almost everyone I know is gainfully
employed because of the Shannon Bit.”
3Because of the need for brevity, we have not discussed all the subtleties involved with
digital signatures. For example, for more security, Alice should add a time stamp and
some random symbols to her signature. For more information on digital signatures, please
refer to one of the standard references such as [18].
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The professor ended his brief discussion of the Shannon Bit by mentioning
that there is one of its properties that we take for granted. I.e., it can be
copied.
4.3. The Quantum World – Introducing the Qubit. Next Professor
Dirac switched to the mysterious world of the quantum. He began by
introducing the runt of the Bit clan, i.e., the Quantum Bit, nicknamed
Qubit. He began by showing the class a small dot, i.e., a quantum dot.
In fact it was so small that Alice couldn’t see it at all. He promptly pulled
out a microscope4, and projected a large image on a screen for the entire
class to view.
Professor Dirac went on to say, “In contrast to the decisive classical Shan-
non Bit, the Qubit is a very indecisive individual. It is both 0 and 1 at the
same time! Moreover, unlike the Shannon Bit, the Qubit cannot be copied
because of the no cloning theorem of Dieks, Wootters, and Zurek[6][25].
Qubits are very slippery characters, exceedingly difficult to deal with.”
“One example of a qubit is a spin 12 particle which can be in a spin-up
state |1〉 which we label as 1, in a spin-down state |0〉 which we label as 0, or
in a superposition of these states, which we interpret as being both 0 and
1 at the same time.” (The term “superposition” will be explained shortly.)
“Another example of a qubit is the polarization state of a photon. A
photon can be in a vertically polarized state |l〉. We assign a label of 1 to
this state. It can be in a horizontally polarized state |↔〉. We assign a
label of 0 to this state. Or, it can be in a superposition of these states. In
this case, we interpret its state as representing both 0 and 1 at the same
time.”
“Anyone who has worn polarized sunglasses should be familiar with the
polarization states of the photon. Polarized sunglasses eliminate glare be-
cause they let through only vertically polarized light while filtering out the
horizontally polarized light that is reflected from the road.”
4.4. Where do qubits live? But where do qubits live? They live in a
Hilbert space H. By a Hilbert space, we mean:
Definition 2. A Hilbert Space is a vector space over the complex numbers
C together with an inner product
〈 , 〉 : H×H −→ C
such that
1) 〈u1 + u2, v〉 = 〈u1, v〉+ 〈u2, v〉 for all u1, u2, v ∈ H
4This is a most unusual microscope!
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2) 〈u, λv〉 = 〈λu, v〉 for all u, v ∈ H and λ ∈ C
3) 〈u, v〉∗ = 〈v, u〉 for all u, v ∈ H , where the superscript ‘∗’ denotes
complex conjugation.
4) For every Cauchy sequence u1, u2, u3, . . . in H,
lim
n→∞
un exists and lies in H
In other words, a Hilbert space is a vector space over the complex numbers
C with a sequilinear inner product in which sequences that should converge
actually do converge to points in the space.
4.5. Some Dirac notation – Introducing kets. The elements of H are
called kets, and will be denoted by
|label〉 ,
where ‘|’ and ‘>’ are left and right delimiters, and ‘label’ denotes any label,
i.e., name, we wish to assign to a ket.
4.6. Finally, a definition of a qubit. So finally, we can define what is
meant by a qubit.
Definition 3. A qubit is a ket (state) in a two dimensional Hilbert space
H.
Thus, if we let |0〉 and |1〉 denote an arbitrary orthonormal basis of a two
dimensional Hilbert space H, then each qubit in H can be written in the
form
|qubit〉 = α0 |0〉+ α1 |0〉
where α0, α1 ∈ C. Since any scalar multiple of a ket represents the same
state of an isolated quantum system, we can assume, without loss of gener-
ality, that |qubit〉 is a ket of unit length, i.e., that
|α0|
2 + |α1|
2 = 1
The above qubit is said to be in a superposition of the states |0〉 and
|1〉. This is what we mean when we say that a qubit can be simultaneously
both 0 and 1. However, if the qubit is observed it immediately “makes a
decision.” It “decides” to be 0 with probability |α0|
2 and 1 with probability
|α1|
2. Some physicists call this the “collapse” of the wave function5.
5It is very difficult, if not impossible, to find two physicists who agree on the subject
of quantum measurement. The phrase “collapse of the wave function” immediately en-
genders a “war cry” in most physicists. For that reason, “collapse” is enclosed in quotes.
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4.7. More Dirac notation – Introducing bras and bra-c-kets. Given
a Hilbert space H, let
H∗ = Hom(H,C)
denote the set of all linear maps from H to C. Then H∗ is actually a Hilbert
space, called the dual Hilbert space of H, with scalar product and vector
sum defined by:

(λ · f) (|Ψ〉) = λ (f(|Ψ〉)) , for all λ ∈ C and for all f ∈ H∗
(f1 + f2) (|Ψ〉) = f1 (|Ψ〉) + f2 (|Ψ〉) , for all f1, f2 ∈ H∗
We call the elements of H∗ bra’s, and denote them as:
〈label|
We can now define a bilinear map
H∗ ×H −→ C
by
(〈Ψ1|) (|Ψ2〉) ∈ C
since bra 〈Ψ1| is a complex valued function of kets. We denote this product
more simply as
〈Ψ1 | Ψ2〉
and call it the Bra-c-Ket (or bracket) of bra 〈Ψ1| and ket |Ψ2〉.
Finally, the bracket induces a dual correspondence6 between H and H∗,
i.e.,
|Ψ2〉
D.C.
←→ 〈Ψ1|
4.8. Activities in the quantum world – Unitary transformations.
All “activities” in the quantum world are linear transformations
U : H −→ H
from the Hilbert space H into itself, called unitary transformations (or,
unitary operators). If we think of linear transformations as matrices, then
a unitary transformation U is a square matrix of complex numbers such
that
U
T
U = I = UU
T
where U
T
denotes the matrix obtained from U by conjugating all its entries
and then transposing the matrix. We denote U
T
by U †, and refer to it as
the adjoint of U .
6This is true for finite dimensional Hilbert spaces. It is more subtle for infinite dimen-
sional Hilbert spaces.
12 SAMUEL J. LOMONACO, JR.
Thus, an “activity” in the quantum world would be, for example, a unitary
transformation U that carries a state ket |Ψ0〉 at time t = 0 to a state ket
|Ψ1〉 at time t = 1, i.e.,
U : |Ψ0〉 7−→ |Ψ1〉
4.9. Observables in quantum mechanics – Hermitian operators. In
quantum mechanics, what does an observer observe?
All observables in the quantum world are linear transformations
O : H −→ H
from the Hilbert space H into itself, called Hermitian operators (or, self-
adjoint operators). If we think of linear transformations as matrices, then
aHermitian operator O is a square matrix of complex numbers such that
O
T
= O
where O
T
again denotes the matrix obtained from O by conjugating all its
entries, and then transposing the matrix. As before, we denote O
T
by O†,
and refer to it as the adjoint of O.
Let |ϕi〉 denote the eigenvectors, called eigenkets, of an observable O,
and let ai denote the corresponding eigenvalue, i.e.,
O : |ϕi〉 = ai |ϕi〉
In the cases we consider in this talk, the eigenkets form an orthonormal basis
of the underlying Hilbert space H.
Finally, we can answer our original question, i.e.,
What does an observer observe?
Let us suppose that we have a physical device M that is so constructed
that it measures an observable O, and that we wish to use M to measure
a quantum system which just happens to be in a quantum state |Ψ〉. We
assume |Ψ〉 is a ket of unit length. The quantum state |Ψ〉 can be written
as a linear combination of the eigenkets of O, i.e.,
|Ψ〉 =
∑
αi |ϕi〉
When we use the device M to measure |Ψ〉, we observe the eigenvalue ai
with probability pi = |αi|
2, and in addition, after the measurement the
quantum system has “collapsed” into the state |ϕi〉. Thus, the outcome of
a measurement is usually random, and usually has a lasting impact on the
state of the quantum system.
We can use Dirac notation to write down an expression for the average
observed value. Namely, the averaged observed value is given by the
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expression 〈Ψ| (O |Ψ〉), which is written more succinctly as 〈Ψ| O |Ψ〉, or
simply as 〈O〉.
4.10. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle – A limitation on what
we can actually observe. There is, surprisingly enough, a limitation of
what can be observed in quantum mechanics.
Two observables A and B are said to be compatible if they commute,
i.e., if
AB = BA.
Otherwise, they are said to be incompatible.
Let [A,B], called the commutator of A and B, denote the expression
[A,B] = AB −BA
In this notation, two operators A andB are compatible if and only if [A,B] =
0. Finally, let
△A = A− 〈A〉
The following principle is one expression of how quantummechanics places
limits on what can be observed:
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle7
〈
(△A)2
〉〈
(△B)2
〉
≥
1
4
‖〈[A,B]〉‖2
where
〈
(△A)2
〉
= 〈Ψ| (△A)2 |Ψ〉 is the mean squared standard devia-
tion of the observed eigenvalue, written in Dirac notation. It is a measure
of the uncertainty in A.
This if A and B are incompatible, i.e., do not commute, then, by mea-
suring A more precisely, we are forced to measure B less precisely, and vice
versa. We can not simultaneously measure both A and B to to unlimited
precision. Measurement of A somehow has an impact on the measurement
of B.
7We have assumed units have been chosen such that ℏ = 1.
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4.11. Young’s two slit experiment – An example of Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle. For the purpose of illustrating Heisenberg’s Un-
certainty Principle, Professor Dirac wheeled out into the classroom a device
to demonstrate Young’s two slit experiment. The device consisted of an
electron gun which spewed out electrons8 in the direction of a wall with
two slits. The electrons that managed to pass through the two slits then
impacted on a backstop which consisted of a 1600×1200 rectangular lattice
of extremely small counters. From the back of the backstop, all of the
1,920,000 tiny counters on the backstop were individually connected to a
PC by a cable consisting of a dense bundle of filaments.
Professor Dirac pointed to the PC, and explained that the PC was setup
to display on the CRT’s 1600×1200 pixel screen the individual running total
counts of all the backstop counters . He went on to say that the intensity
P (i, j) of pixel (i, j) on the screen was proportional to the total number of
electrons counted so far by the counter at position (i, j) in the backstop.
Professor Dirac proceeded to demonstrate what the device could actually
do. He turned on the electron gun, and turned down its intensity so low
that the probability of more than two electrons being emitted at the same
time was negligibly small.
His first experiment with the device was to cover slit 2, allowing the
incoming electrons to pass only through slit 1. He reset all the counters on
the backstop to zero, and then stepped back to let the students in his class
view the screen.
Initially nothing could be seen on the screen but blackness. However,
gradually an intensity pattern began to form on the screen. At first the
displayed pattern was indiscernible. But eventually it began to look like the
intensity pattern of a classical two dimensional Gaussian distribution. He
then pressed a key on his computer to show a three dimensional plot of the
intensity P (i, j) as a surface in 3-space. Then with the click of a mouse,
he displayed a plot of the intensity P (i, j) along the vertical line j = 800
going down the center of the screen. The plot was that of the bell shaped
classical one dimensional Gaussian distribution curve P1, as shown in Fig.
3a. This was a clear indication that the random impacts on the backstop
were obeying the classical Gaussian distribution.
When he repeated the experiment with the slit 1 instead of slit 2 covered,
exactly the same pattern of a classical two dimensional Gaussian distribution
pattern was seen, but only this time shifted vertically down a short distance
on the screen. A plot of the intensity P (i, j) of along the vertical line
j = 800 going down the center of the screen is indicated by curve P2 shown
in Fig. 3a.
8The original Young’s two slit experiment used photons rather than electrons.
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Figure 3a. Young’s two slit experiment with one slit closed.
Professor Dirac then asked the students in the class what pattern they
thought would appear if he left both of the slits uncovered. Most of the
class responded by saying that the resulting light pattern would simply be
the sum of the two patterns, i.e., the bell shaped curve P1+P2, as illustrated
in Fig. 3c by the curve labeled P ′12. Most of the class was convinced that the
two classical probability distributions would simply add, as many of them
had learned in the probability course Prob 323.
The remainder of the class stated quite emphatically that they did not
care what happened. What was being illustrated was far from an applied
area, and hence not relevant to their real world. Or so they thought ...
Professor Dirac smiled, and then proceeded to uncover both slits. What
appeared on the screen to almost everyone’s surprise was not the pattern
with the bell shape P1+P2. It was instead a light pattern with a wavy bell
shaped curve, as illustrated by the curve P12 in Fig. 3b.
Figure 3b. Young’s two slit experiment with both slits open.
Professor Dirac explained, “Something non-classical had occurred. Un-
like classical probabilities, the quantum probabilities (or more correctly
stated, the quantum amplitudes) had interfered with one another to produce
an interference pattern. In the dark areas, one finds destructive interference.
In the bright areas, one finds constructive interference.”
“Indeed, something non-classical is happening here.”
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“Strangely enough, quantum mechanics is telling us that each electron is
actually passing through both slits simultaneously! It is as if each electron
were a wave and not a particle.”
“But what happens when we actually try to observe through which slit
each electron passes?”
Professor Dirac pulled out his trusty microscope9 to observe which of the
two slits each electron passed through. He reset all the backstop counters
to zero, turned on the device, and began observing through which slit each
electron passed through. The class was much surprised to find that the
wavey interference pattern did not appear on the screen this time. Instead,
what appeared was the classical intensity pattern all had initially expected
to see in the first place, i.e., the intensity pattern of the bell shaped curve
P12 = P1 + P2, as shown in Fig. 3c.
”So we see that, when observed, the electrons act as particles and not as
waves!”
Figure 3c. Young’s 2 slit experiment when the slit through which the
electron passes is determined by observation.
After a brief pause, Professor Dirac said, “This is actually an example of
the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. We can see this as follows:”
“In the experiment, we are effectively observing two incompatible observ-
ables, the position operator X (i.e., which slit each electron passes through)
and the momentum operator P (i.e., the momentum with which each elec-
tron leaves the slitted wall.) When we observe the momentum P , the
interference pattern is present. But when we observe the position X, the
interference pattern vanishes. We can not observe position without disturb-
ing momentum, and vice versa.”
5. The Beginnings of Quantum Cryptography
9This is a most unusual microscope.
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5.1. Alice has an idea. After class on her way back to her dorm room,
Alice began once again to ruminate over her dilemma in regard to Bob and
Eve.
“If only her message to Bob were like the interference pattern in Young’s
two slit experiment. Then, if the prying Eve were to observe which of the
two slits each of the electrons emerged from (i.e., ‘listen in’), Bob would
know of her presence. For, if Eve were observing the individual electrons
as they left the slits, the pattern on the screen would be distorted from
the beautiful wavy interference pattern in a direction toward the dull ugly
Gaussian distribution pattern. Bob would see this distortion, and thereby
be able to surmise that Eve was eavesdropping.”
Figure 4a. Bob sees an interference pattern when Eve is not eavesdropping.
Figure 4b. Bob sees no interference pattern when Eve is eavesdropping.
“This idea has possibilities. Maybe quantum mechanics is relevant after
all!”
Her mind began to race. “Perhaps something like Young’s two slit ex-
periment could be used to communicate random key K? Then Bob could
tell which key had been compromised by an intruder such as Eve. But most
importantly, he could also surmise which key had not been compromised.
Bob could then communicate to me over the phone (or even over any public
channel available also to Eve) whether or not the key had been compro-
mised, without, of course, revealing the key itself. Any uncompromised key
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could then be employed to send Bob a message by using the one-time-pad
that was mentioned yesterday in Crypto 351.”
“The beauty of this approach is that the one-time-pad is perfectly secure.
There is no way whatsoever that Eve could get any information about our
conversation. This would be true even if I used the campus radio station
to send my encrypted message.”
“The evil Eve is foiled! Eureka! Contrary to student conventional
wisdom, both cryptography and quantum mechanics are relevant to the real
world!”
“I have discovered a new kind of secrecy, i.e., quantum secrecy, which
has built-in detection of eavesdropping based on the principles of quantum
mechanics. I can hardly wait to tell Professor Dirac. She ran immediately
to his office.”
After listening to Alice’s excited impromptu, and at times disjointed,
explanation, Professor Dirac suggested that she present her newly found
discoveries in his next class. Alice happily agreed to do so.
5.2. Quantum secrecy – The BB84 protocol without noise. Two
days later, after two sleepless but productive nights of work, Alice was pre-
pared for her presentation. She walked in the classroom for Quantum 317
carrying an overhead projector and a sizable bundle of transparencies.
After Professor Dirac had turned the large lecture hall over to her, she
began as follows:
“Let us suppose that I (Alice) would like to transmit a secret key K to
Bob. Let us also suppose that someone by the name of Eve intends to make
every effort to eavesdrop on the transmission and learn the secret key.”
Wouldn’t you know it. Eve just so happens to be sitting in the classroom!
“My objective today is to show you how the principles of quantum me-
chanics can be used to build a cryptographic communication system in such
a way that the system detects if Eve is eavesdropping, and which also gives
a guarantee of no intrusion if Eve is not eavesdropping.”
“A diagrammatic outline of the system I’m about to describe is shown on
the screen. (Please refer to Fig. 5.) Please note that the system consists
of two communication channels. One is a non-classical one-way quantum
communication channel, which I will soon describe. The other is an ordinary
run-of the-mill classical two-way public channel, such as a two-way radio
communication system. I emphasize that this classical two-way channel is
public, and open to whomever would like to listen in. For the time being,
I will assume that the two-way public channel is noise free.”
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Figure 5. A quantum cryptographic communication system.
“I will now describe how the polarization states of the photon can be used
to construct a quantum one-way communication channel10.”
“From Professor Dirac’s last lecture, we know that the polarization states
of a photon lie in a two dimensional Hilbert space H. For this space,
there are many orthonormal bases. We will use only two for our quantum
channel.”
“The first is the basis consisting of the vertical and horizontal polariza-
tion states, i.e., the kets |l〉 and |↔〉, respectively. We will refer to this
orthonormal basis as the vertical/horizontal (V/H) basis, and denote
this basis with the symbol ‘⊞.’ ”
“The second orthonormal basis consists of the polarization states |ր〉
and |տ〉, which correspond to polarizations directions formed respectively
by 45% clockwise and counter-clockwise rotations off from the vertical. We
call this the oblique basis, and denote this basis with the symbol ‘⊠.’ ”
“If I (Alice) decide to use the VH basis ⊞ on the quantum channel, then
I will use the following quantum alphabet:


“1” = |l〉
“0” = |↔〉
In other words, if I use this quantum alphabet on the quantum channel, I
will transmit a “1” to Bob simply by sending a photon in the polarization
state |l〉., and I will transmit a “0” by sending a photon in the polarization
state |↔〉.”
10Any two dimensional quantum system such as a spin 1
2
particle could be used.
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“On the other hand, if I (Alice) decide to use the oblique basis ⊠, then I
will use the following quantum alphabet:


“1” = |ր〉
“0” = |տ〉
,
sending a “1” as a photon in the polarization state |ր〉, and sending a “0”
as a photon in the polarization state |տ〉.”
“I have chosen these two bases because the Heisenberg Uncertainty Prin-
ciple implies that observations with respect to the ⊞ basis are incompatible
with observations with respect to the ⊠ basis. We will soon see how this
incompatibility can be translated into intrusion detection.”
Alice ⊞ ⊠ ⊠ ⊠ ⊞ ⊠ ⊞ ⊠ ⊞ ⊠
l տ տ ր l տ ↔ ր ↔ ր
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
| | | |
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
| | | |
Bob ⊠ ⊠ ⊞ ⊠ ⊞ ⊠ ⊞ ⊞ ⊞ ⊞
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
m
Raw Key⇒ 0 1 1 0 0 0
Fig. 6a. The BB84 protocol without Eve present (No noise)
Alice and Bob now communicate with one another using a two stage
protocol, called the BB84 protocol[?]. (Please refer to Figs. 6a and 6b.)
In stage 1, Alice creates a random sequence of bits, which she sends to
Bob over the quantum channel using the following protocol:
Stage 1 protocol: Communication over a quantum channel
Step 1. Alice flips a fair coin to generate a random sequence SAlice of zeroes
and ones. This sequence will be used to construct a secret key shared
only by Alice and Bob.
Step 2. For each bit of the random sequence, Alice flips a fair coin again to
choose at random one of the two quantum alphabets. She then trans-
mits the bit as a polarized photon according to the chosen alphabet.
QUANTUM CRYTOGRAPHY 21
Step 3. Each time Bob receives a photon sent by Alice, he has no way of know-
ing which quantum alphabet was chosen by Alice. So he simply uses
the flip of a fair coin to select one of the two alphabets and makes his
measurement accordingly. Half of the time he will be lucky and choose
the same quantum alphabet as Eve. In this case, the bit resulting from
his measurement will agree with the bit sent by Alice. However, the
other half of the time he will be unlucky and choose the alphabet not
used by Alice. In this case, the bit resulting from his measurement
will agree with the bit sent by Alice only 50% of the time. After all
these measurements, Bob now has in hand a binary sequence SBob.
Alice and Bob now proceed to communicate over the public two-way chan-
nel using the following stage 2 protocol:
Stage 2 protocol: Communication over a public channel
Phase 1. Raw key extraction
Step 1. Over the public channel, Bob communicates to Alice which quantum
alphabet he used for each of his measurements.
Step 2. In response, Alice communicates to Bob over the public channel which
of his measurements were made with the correct alphabet.
Step 3. Alice and Bob then delete all bits for which they used incompatible
quantum alphabets to produce their resulting raw keys. If Eve has
not eavesdropped, then their resulting raw keys will be the same. If
Eve has eavesdropped, their resulting raw keys will not be in total
agreement.
Phase 2. Error estimation
Step 1. Over the public channel, Alice and Bob compare small portions of their
raw keys to estimate the error-rate R, and then delete the disclosed
bits from their raw keys to produce their tentative final keys. If
through their public disclosures, Alice and Bob find no errors (i.e.,
R = 0), then they know that Eve was not eavesdropping and that
their tentative keys must be the same final key. If they discover at
least one error during their public disclosures (i.e., R > 0), then they
know that Eve has been eavesdropping. In this case, they discard
their tentative final keys and start all over again11.
11If Eve were to intercept each qubit received from Alice, to measure it, and then to
masqurade as Alice by sending on to Bob a qubit in the state she measured, then Eve
would be introducing a 25% error rate in Bob’s raw key. This method of eavesdropping
is called opaque eavesdropping. We will discuss this eavesdropping strategy as well as
others at a later time.
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Alice ⊞ ⊠ ⊠ ⊠ ⊞ ⊠ ⊞ ⊠ ⊞ ⊠
l տ տ ր l տ ↔ ր ↔ ր
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
Eve ⊠ ⊞ ⊞ ⊠ ⊞ ⊞ ⊠ ⊠ ⊞ ⊞
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
Bob ⊠ ⊠ ⊞ ⊠ ⊞ ⊠ ⊞ ⊞ ⊞ ⊞
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
∗ 0 ∗ 1 1 1 1 ∗ 0 ∗
E E
Fig 6b. The BB84 with Eve present (No noise)
5.3. Quantum secrecy – The BB84 protocol with noise. Alice con-
tinues her presentation by addressing the issue of noise.
“So far we have assumed that our cryptographic communication system
is noise free. But every realistic communication system has noise present.
Consequently, we now need to modify our quantum protocol to allow for the
presence of noise.”
“We must assume that Bob’s raw key is noisy. Since Bob can not dis-
tinguish between errors caused by noise and by those caused by Eve’s intru-
sion, the only practical working assumption he can adopt is that all errors
are caused by Eve’s eavesdropping. Under this working assumption, Eve is
always assumed to have some information about bits transmitted from Alice
to Bob. Thus, raw key is always only partially secret.”
“What is needed is a method to distill a smaller secret key from a larger
partially secret key. We call this privacy amplification. We will now
create from the old protocol a new protocol that allows for the presence of
noise, a protocol that includes privacy amplification.”
Stage 1 protocol: Communication over a quantum channel
This stage is exactly the same as before, except that errors are now also
induced by noise.
Stage 2 protocol: Communication over a public channel
Phase 1 protocol: Raw key extraction.
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This phase is exactly the same as in the noise-free protocol, except that
Alice and Bob also delete those bit locations at which Bob should have
received but did not receive a bit. Such “non-receptions” could be caused
by Eve’s intrusion or by dark counts in Bob’s detection device. The
location of dark counts are communicated by Bob to Alice over the public
channel.
Phase 2 protocol: Error estimation.
Over the public channel, Alice and Bob compare small portions of their
raw keys to estimate the error-rate R, and then delete the disclosed bits from
their raw key to produce their tentative final keys. If R exceeds a certain
threshold RMax, then privacy amplification is not possible If so, Alice and
Bob return to stage 1 to start over. On the other hand, if R ≤ RMax, then
Alice and Bob proceed to phase 3.
Phase 3 protocol: Extraction of reconciled key12.
In this phase13, Alice and Bob remove all errors from what remains of
raw key to produce a common error-free key, called reconciled key.
Step 1. Alice and Bob publically agree upon a random permutation, and apply
it to what remains of their respective raw keys. Next Alice and Bob
partition the remnant raw key into blocks of length ℓ, where the length
ℓ is chosen so that blocks of that length are unlikely to have more
than one error. For each of these blocks, Alice and Bob publically
compare overall parity checks, making sure each time to discard the
last bit of each compared block. Each time an overall parity check
does not agree, Alice and Bob initiate a binary search for the error,
i.e., bisecting the block into two subblocks, publically comparing the
parities for each of these subblocks, discarding the right most bit of
each subblock. They continue their bisective search on the subblock
for which their parities are not in agreement. This bisective search
continues until the erroneous bit is located and deleted. They then
continue to the next ℓ-block.
This step is repeated, i.e., a random permutation is chosen, a rem-
nant raw key is partitioned into blocks of length ℓ, parities are com-
pared, etc.. This is done until it becomes inefficient to continue in this
fashion.
12There are more efficient and elegant procedures than the procedure descibed in Stage
2 Phase 3. See [13] for references.
13The procedure given in Stage 2 Phase 3 is only one of many different possible pro-
cedures. In fact, there are much more efficient and elegant procedures than the one
described herein.
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Step 2. Alice and Bob publically select randomly chosen subsets of remnant
raw key, publically compare parities, each time discarding an agreed
upon bit from their chosen key sample. If a parity should not agree,
they employ the binary search strategy of Step 1 to locate and delete
the error.
• Finally, when, for some fixed number N of consecutive repetitions of
Step 2, no error is found, Alice and Bob assume that to a high probabil-
ity, the remnant raw key is without error. Alice and Bob now rename
the remnant raw key reconciled key, and proceed to the next phase.
Phase 4: Privacy amplification
Alice and Bob now have a common reconciled key which they know is
only partially secret from Eve. They now begin the process of privacy
amplification, which is the extraction of a secret key from a partially secret
one.
Step 1. Alice and Bob compute from the error-rate R obtained in Phase 2 of
Stage 2 an upper bound k of the number of bits of reconciled key known
by Eve.
Let n denote the number of bits in reconciled key, and let s be a security
parameter to be adjusted as required.
Step 2. Alice and Bob publically select n− k− s random subsets of reconciled
key, without revealing their contents. The undisclosed parities of these
subsets become the final secret key.
It can be shown that Eve’s average information about the final secret key
is less than 2−s/ ln 2 bits.
The bell rang, indicating the end of the period. The entire class with two
exceptions, immediately raced out of the lecture hall, almost knocking Alice
down as they passed by. Professor Dirac thanked Alice for an excellent
presentation.
As Alice left, she saw Eve in one of the dark recesses of the large lecture
hall with her head resting on the palm of her hand as if in deep thought.
She had a frown on her face. Alice left with a broad smile on her face.
6. The B92 quantum cryptographic protocol
In the next class, Alice continued her last presentation.
In thinking about the BB84 protocol this weekend, I was surprised to
find that it actually is possible to build a different quantum protocol that
uses only one quantum alphabet instead of two. I’ll call this new quantum
protocol B92.”
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“As before, we will describe the protocol in terms of the polarization
states of the photon14.”
“As our quantum alphabet, we choose

“1” = |θ+〉
“0” = |θ−〉
,
where |θ+〉 and |θ−〉 denote respectively the polarization states of a photon
linearly polarized at angles θ and −θ with respect to the vertical, where
0 < θ < pi4 .”
“We assume that Bob’s quantum receiver, called a POVM receiver[3],
is base on the following observables15:

Aθ+ =
1 − |θ
−
〉〈θ
−
|
1 + 〈θ+|θ−〉
Aθ
−
= 1 − |θ+〉〈θ+|1 + 〈θ+|θ−〉
A? = 1−Aθ+ −Aθ−
,
where Aθ+ is the observable for |θ+〉, Aθ− the observable for |θ−〉 and A? is
the observables for inconclusive receptions.”
The B92 quantum protocol is as follows:
Stage 1 protocol. Communication over a quantum channel.
Step 1. The same as in the BB84 protocol. Alice flips a fair coin to
generate a random sequence SAlice of zeroes and ones. This sequence will
be used to construct a secret key shared only by Alice and Bob.
Step 2. The same as in the previous protocol, except this time Alice uses
only one alphabet, the one above. So she does not have to flip a coin to
choose an alphabet.
Step 3. Bob uses his POVM receiver to measure photons received from
Alice.
Stage 2. Communication in four phases over a public channel.
This stage is the same as in the BB84 protocol, except that in phase 1,
Bob publically informs Alice as to which time slots he received non-erasures.
The bits in these time slots become Alice’s and Bob’s raw keys.
Alice completed her discussion of the B92 protocol with,
14Any two dimensional quantum system such as a spin 1
2
particle could be used.
15The observables Aθ+ , Aθ− , and A? form a postive operator value measure (POVM).
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“Eve’s presence is again detected by an unusual error rate in Bob’s raw
key. Moreover, for some but not all eavesdropping strategies, Eve can also
be detected by an unusual erasure rate for Bob.”
Alice then stepped down from the lecture hall podium and returned to
her seat.
7. There are many other quantum cryptographic protocols
Before continuing our story about Alice, Bob, and Eve, there are a few
points that need to be made:
There are many other quantum cryptographic protocols. Quantum pro-
tocols showing the greatest promise for security are those based on EPR
pairs. Unfortunately, the technology for implementing such protocols is not
yet available. For references on various protocols, please refer to [13].
8. A comparison of quantum cryptography with classical and
public key cryptography
Quantum cryptography’s unique contribution is that it provides a mech-
anism for eavesdropping detection. This is an entirely new contribution to
cryptography. On the other hand, one of the main drawbacks of quantum
cryptography is that it provides no mechanism for authentication, i.e., for
detecting whether or not Alice and Bob are actually communicating with
each other, and not with an intermediate Eve masquerading as each of them.
Thus, the Catch 22 problem is not solved by quantum cryptography. Before
Alice and Bob can begin their quantum protocol, they first need to send an
authentication key over a secure channel.
Thus, quantum cryptography’s unique contribution is to provide a means
of expanding existing secure key. Quantum protocols are secure key ex-
panders. First a small authentication key is exchanged over a secure
channel. Then that key can be amplified to an arbitrary length through
quantum cryptography.
Check List for Q. Crypto. Sys.
 Catch 22 Solved? YES & NO
 Authentication? NO
 Intrusion Detection? YES
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9. Eavesdropping strategies and counter measures
Now let us resume our story:
Not a split second after Alice had seated herself, Eve raised her hand
and asked for permission to make her own presentation to the class. Pro-
fessor Dirac yielded the podium, not knowing exactly what to expect, but
nonetheless elated that his usually phlegmatic class was beginning to show
signs of something he had not seen for some time, class participation and
initiative.
Eve began, “In the last two classes, Alice has suggested that I (Eve) might
be eager to eavesdrop on her conversations with my ♥close♥ friend ♥Bob♥.
I assure you that that simply is in no way true.”
“But such innuendo really doesn’t bother me.”
9.1. Opaque eavesdropping. “What really irks me is that Alice suggests
that, if I were to eavesdrop (which never would happen), then I (Eve) would
use opaque eavesdropping. By opaque eavesdropping, I mean that
I (Eve) would intercept and observe (measure) Alice’s photons, and then
masquerade as Alice by sending photons in the states I had measured on to
Bob.”
“I assure you that, if I ever wanted to eavesdrop (which will never be the
case), I would not use such a simplistic form of intrusion.”
Eve really wanted to use the adjective ‘stupid’ instead of ‘simplistic,’ but
restrained herself.
Eve then said indignantly, “If I ever were to eavesdrop (which would never
happen), I would use more sophisticated, more intelligent, and yes ... , more
deliciously devious schemes!”
9.2. Translucent eavesdropping without entanglement. “I (Eve) could
for example make my probe interact unitarily with the information carrier
from Alice, and then let it proceed on to Bob in a slightly modified state.
For the B92 protocol, the interaction is given by:


|θ+〉 |ψ〉 7−→ U |θ+〉 |ψ〉 =
∣∣θ′+
〉
|ψ+〉
|θ−〉 |ψ〉 7−→ U |θ−〉 |ψ〉 =
∣∣θ′−
〉
|ψ−〉
,
where |ψ〉 and |ψ±〉 denote respectively the state of my (Eve’s) probe before
and after the interaction and where |θ±〉 and
∣∣θ′±
〉
denote respectively the
state of Alice’s photon before and after the interaction.”
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9.3. Translucent eavesdropping with entanglement. “Another approach,
one of the most sophisticated, would be for me (EVE) to entangle my probe
with the information carrier from Alice, and then let it proceed on to Bob.
For the B92 protocol, the interaction is given by:


|θ+〉 |ψ〉 7−→ U |θ+〉 |ψ〉 = a
∣∣θ′+
〉
|ψ+〉+ b
∣∣θ′−
〉
|ψ+〉
|θ−〉 |ψ〉 7−→ U |θ−〉 |ψ〉 = b
∣∣θ′+
〉
|ψ−〉+ a
∣∣θ′−
〉
|ψ−〉
,
where |ψ〉 and |ψ±〉 denote respectively the state of my (Eve’s) probe before
and after the entanglement and where |θ±〉 and
∣∣θ′±
〉
denote respectively the
state of Alice’s photon before and after the entanglement.”
9.4. Eavesdropping based on implementation weaknesses. “On the
other hand, I could also take advantage of implementation weaknesses.”
“One of the great difficulties with quantum cryptography is that tech-
nology has not quite caught up with it. Many devices, such as lasers, do
not emit a single quantum, but many quanta at each emission time. The
implementation of quantum protocols really requires single-quantum emit-
ters. Such single-quantum emitters are now under development. Until such
emitters become available, the quantum protocols can only be approximately
implemented.”
“For example, for many optical implementations of quantum protocols,
the laser intensity is turned down so that on the average only one photon is
produced every 10 pulses. Thus, if anything is emitted at all (one chance out
of 10), then the probability that it is a single photon is extremely high. How-
ever, when there is an emission, then there is a probability of 1200 that more
than one photon is emitted. So it is conceivable that I (Eve) could build an
eavesdropping device that would detect multiple photon transmissions, and,
when so detected, would divert one of the photons for measurement. In
this way, I (Eve) could conceivably read 1200 of Alice’s transmission without
being detected. One way of countering this type of threat is to allow for it
during privacy amplification. Another is to develop devices which actually
truly emit one quanta at a time.”
“Finally, depending on Alice’s implementation, it might also be possible
for me (Eve) to gain information simply by observing Alice’s transmitter
without measuring its output. This may or may not be far fetched.”
Eve then returned to her seat. Her face was lit up with a sinister grin of
satisfaction.
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10. Implementations
Before continuing our story, we should mention that quantum crypto-
graphic protocols have been implemented over more than 30 kilometers of
fiber optic cable, [20],[21],[22], [23], and most amazingly, over more than a
kilometer of free space [4], [5], [11],[9], [10] in the presence of ambient sun-
light. There have been a number of ambitious proposals to demonstrate
the feasibility of quantum cryptography in earth to satellite communica-
tions. And as mentioned earlier, there is a clear need for the development
of single-quantum emitting devices.
11. Conclusion
Much remains to be done. There has been some work on the develop-
ment of multiple-user quantum cryptographic protocols for communication
networks[24]. There also have been at least two independent claims of the
proof of ultimate security, i.e., a proof that quantum cryptographic proto-
cols are impervious to all possible eavesdropping strategies [12], [15], [16],
[17].
Our story continues:
As Alice sat in her seat, she happened to spy in the corner of her eye an
abrupt change in Eve’s demeanor. Eve suddenly became agitated, lit up
with excitement, and started to frantically write on her notepad. The bell
rang. Eve immediately jumped up, and raced out of the lecture hall, being
pushed along by the usual frantic mass of students, equally eager to get out
of the classroom.
As Eve whisked past, Alice caught just a fleeting glimpse of Eve’s notepad.
All Alice was able to discern in that brief moment was an illegible jumble
of equations and ... yes, ... the acronym “POVM.”
Alice thought to herself, “Oh, well! ... Forget it! I think I’ll just visit
Bob this weekend.”
THE END16
16Any resemblance of the characters in this manuscript to individuals living or dead is
purely coincidental.
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